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A key question in development economics is the relation between a country's
financial system and its economic development. Historians such as Gerschenkron (1962)
have sought to explain a perceived relation between the differences in the pattern of
economic development between Britain and the Continental European economies and the
differences between bank-based and market-based financial systems. More recently, the
differences in the relative performance of the Japanese and the US economies have led
observers to conclude that bank-based and market-based financial systems may produce
different growth patterns.  1 This view has been challenged by Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV) (1998, 1999), who argue that the legal system in a country is
a primary determinant of the effectiveness of its financial system. An implication of this
hypothesis is that the distinction between market-based and bank-based financial systems
may not be of primary importance for policy.
In this paper we use firm-level data from a panel of forty countries to analyze how
a country's legal and financial systems affect firms' access to external finance to fund
growth. For each country we predict a financial system based on the country's legal
environment. We use our estimates to ask:  Does the financial system have an effect
independent of the legal system?  Is the use of external financing different in market-
based and bank-based systems? Do the market-based and bank-based systems differ in
the provision of long-term and short-term funds?
We find that the use of external financing by firms is positively related to the
development of both the predicted banking system and the securities markets in each
3country. However, in our sample we do not find evidence that variations in the
development of the financial system that are unrelated to the legal system affect access to
external finance. In particular, we find no evidence that firms use external financing
differently if they are in countries classified as bank-based or market-based, on the basis
of the development of their banking sector relative to their securities markets.
These results are consistent with the LLSV approach that stresses the primacy of
the legal system. The policy implication that flows from the results is that the way to
improve access to external finance is to aid in the development of a country's legal
system, and then to let firms and investors contract either directly (as in a market-based
system) or through the intermediation of banks.
We also find that securities markets and bank development have a different effect
on the type of external finance firms obtain, particularly at relatively low levels of
financial development. In those countries where the legal contracting environment
predicts a high level of development for securities markets, more firms grow at rates
requiring long-term external finance. We do not find the same effect for predicted bank
development. Thus, especially for countries with lower levels of financial development,
differences in contracting environments that affect the relative development of the stock
market and the banking system may have implications for which firms and which
projects obtain financing.
There exists a growing literature on the effect of financial sector development on
economic development. King and Levine (1993a,b) highlight the importance of financial
development for macro-economic growth. Recently Levine and Zervos (1998), Rajan and
' For a critical  examination  of the effect  of the legal and market  environment  on corporate  finance  see Stulz
(1999). Allen (1993) and Allen and  Gale (1999)  provide  analyses  of the relative  benefits  of market-based
4Zingales (1998) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) explore the relation
between financial development and growth of countries, industries and firms,
respectively. 2
The importance of the legal system for corporate finance was first explored by
LLSV (1998). Modigliani and Perotti (1999) argue that in the absence of a strong legal
system that can protect the rights of external investors, financial transactions are
intermediated through institutions or concentrated among agents who have sufficient
bargaining power to enforce their rights privately. Empirical evidence on the effect of
legal effectiveness on firm growth and financing is provided by Demirguc-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1998, 1999), and on growth at more aggregated levels by Levine (1998,
1999, 2000). This paper extends the methodology of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998) to address the questions of the differences in bank-based  and market-based
systems in firm growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2. briefly discusses reasons
to believe that bank-based and market-based systems perform differently, and our
approach to testing those differences empirically. Section 3. introduces the data and
summary statistics. Our principal results are reported in Section 4.. Section 5. concludes.
2. BANK-BASED AND MARKET-BASED FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
2.1 How do the systems differ?
Among a financial system's major tasks is to mobilize resources for investment,
select investment projects to be funded, and to provide incentives for the monitoring of
and bank-based  financial  systems.
2 See also  Wurgler  (2000) for an analysis  of industry  growth.
5the performance of the funded investments.  A large body of theoretical and empirical
research has analyzed how these tasks are performed in a market-based system, and how
they are performed in a system where banks and other financial intermediaries play a
major role. This research has identified significant differences in incentives. These
differences raise the possibility that a bank-based or a market-based system is inherently
superior, and that economic performance can be enhanced by adopting the superior
system.
A second approach, identified with LLSV (1999), stresses the importance of the
legal system in determining the enforceable contracts between firms and investors.
According to this view, the relevant differences between countries is in the extent to
which their financial systems protect investor rights. The distinction between bank-based
and market-based systems is seen as secondary.
In our examination of the differences between bank-based and market-based
financial systems we adopt a maintained hypothesis that has elements of both of these
approaches. We posit that there exist significant differences in outcomes between systems
in which financial intermediaries like banks play the dominant role and those where they
do not. For example, as explored by Allen and Gale (1999), banks and stock markets may
have a comparative advantage in selecting different types of investment projects. Banks
may also have a comparative advantage in providing short-term financing.
In common with the legal approach, we posit that the absolute quality of the
banks and securities markets in a country depends on the legal system's ability to enforce
contracts. However, we argue that the legal systems in different countries may have a
comparative advantage in supporting a quality banking system or a quality securities
6markets. Thus, for example, a country with an inefficient legal system may have a low-
quality financial system. However, it may, through a combination of administrative
regulation of the banking system, and strong banks with bargaining power vis-a-vis their
customers, partially compensate for the effect of the deficiency of the legal system on
banks. It may be more difficult to compensate for the effect of poor legal protections on a
securities markets. Thus, while the level of development of the legal system in each
country may be the major determinant of the quantity of financial services supplied, the
comparative advantage in supporting intermediaries and markets may determine the
optimal mix of banks versus markets.
These considerations suggest the following hypotheses:
Hi. For each country there is a "warranted" level of development of the banking
sector and of stock markets, as a function of the level of development of the contracting
environment. The provision of external financing to firms is greater, the higher the
warranted level of development of these sectors.
H2. The expansion of one of the sectors, banks or securities markets beyond the
levels warranted by the contracting environment is unlikely to produce an improved
allocation of resources.
H3. Because the banking system and securities markets have a comparative
advantage in providing different services, cross-country differences in the warranted
development levels of markets and the banking sectors may affect the type of finance
constraints faced by firms.
72.2 Testing for differences in performance between the systems
Differences between outcomes in market-based and bank-based systems should, if
they exist, be observable at the country, industry or firm levels. In principle, a test would
relate a performance measure, usually the growth rate, to the financial system or legal
system characteristics. While this results in straightforward applications at the country
level, there exists a potential  selection bias when this procedure is applied at lower levels
of aggregation, such as the industry and firm levels.
The selection bias may arise because the way in which production is organized in
different countries may depend on their legal and financial systems. Thus, the firms that
are observed in a country are those that are adapted to the financial system of that
country. Analyzing growth rates of those firms does not take into account the possibility
that a different financial system might induce a different mix of firms, and that the
different mix might increase wealth.
To fix ideas, consider an example involving two countries, B and M. Country B
has a bank-based financial system (perhaps because its legal system favors that type of
contracting). Country M has a market-based system. Assume that the two financial
systems have different comparative advantages in supplying financing. In particular,
assume that market-based systems are superior at providing long-term financing.
Consider entrepreneurs in each country starting firms in the same industry. Entrepreneurs
in country M have a greater choice of technology and organizational forms since they
have greater access to long-term financing. As a result, economy M is better off.
However, once the initial investment is made, each individual firm, and the industry as a
whole, may grow at the same rate in country B and in country M.  Indeed, firms in
8country B may grow faster, because they can switch to a superior technology as they
accumulate enough funds over time to self-finance its acquisition. In this case, a
comparison of firm or industry growth rates across countries may not identify the benefits
of a market-based financial system.
An alternative approach, developed in Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), is
to test for differences between financial systems by testing whether the proportion of
firms growing at rates that exceed the rate that they can self-finance, or finance using
short-term instruments only, differs across different financial or legal systems. 3 This is
the approach we employ below, using firm-specific data to determine whether each firm
in the sample is constrained.
While the use of firm-specific data brings advantages, it also entails two potential
costs. First, the firms for which data is available are likely to be a relatively small number
of the largest publicly traded firms in each economy. While such firms are of independent
interest, they may not be fully representative of firms in the economy.4 Second, as
discussed by Ball (1995), the quality of firm-level financial data may differ across
countries. Thus, the findings of firm-level and industry-level studies need to be assessed
jointly.
3. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
3.1 Description of Sample
The firm-level data consist of financial statements for the largest publicly traded
manufacturing firms in 40 countries  (SIC codes 2000-3999).  Our sample of firms
contains 45,598 annual observations over the period 1989-1996. The sample is from
3 This approach  would  identify  the financial  system  in economy  M above as being superior.
9Worldscope  and contains data  from both developed  and developing  countries  as listed in
Table  Al in the Appendix. For each of the countries  we also use data on financial  system
development  compiled  by Beck,  Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine  (1999).
In Table 1 we present  pertinent  facts  about  the level of economic  and institutional
development  in the sample  countries. The countries  are arranged  from highest  to lowest
average  per capita Gross Domestic  Product  (RGDPPC)  in 1990  dollars. They range from
Switzerland,  with a per capita  income of $26,972  to Pakistan,  with a per capita income of
$319.
Table 1
Legal and Financial Indicators
GDP/CAP is the real GDP per capita in 1990 US$. Law and order indicator, produced by Intemational Country Risk rating agency, reflects the
degree to which the citizens of a country are willing  to accept the established institutions to make and  implement laws and adjudicate disputes. It
is scored  0-6 with  higher  scores  indicating  sound  political  institutions  and a strong  court  system.  Lower  scores  indicate  a tradition  of depending  on
physical  force or illegal  means  to settle  claims.  Common  Law Dummy  takes the value one for common  law countries  and the value zero for
others.  Creditor  rights is an index  that ranges  from 0 to 4 and aggregates  creditor  rights  and Shareholder  rights is an index that ranges from 0
to 5 and aggregates  shareholder  rights as described  in the text.  These three variables  are obtained  from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer
and Vishny  (1996).  Tumover  is the total  value of shares  traded  in the stock  exchange  divided  by market  capitalization.  Stock market  data are
from IFC's Emerging  Market  Data Base.  BankWGDP  is the total assets  of the deposit  money  banks  divided  by GDP. It is obtained  from IMF,
Intemational  Financial  Statistics.  Marketl is a variable  that takes  on  the value I for market-based  financial  systems  and 0 for bank-based  systems
as defined  in Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine  (1999).  All values  are 1989-96  averages.
GDP/CAP  Law and  Common  Creditor  Shareholder  Tumover  Bank/GDP  Marketl
(US S)  Order  Law Dummy  Rights  Rights
Indicator  Index  Index
Switzerland  26972  6.00  0  1  2  0.74  1.74  0
Japan  23467  5.44  0  2  4  0.43  1.31  0
Norway  22162  6.00  0  2  4  0.52  0.71  0
Denmark  21447  6.00  0  3  2  0.42  0.51  0
United  States  19998  6.00  1  1  5  0.71  0.75  1
Sweden  19582  6.00  0  2  3  0.42  0.55  1
Finland  18521  6.00  0  1  3  0.32  0.79  0
Germany  17804  5.75  0  3  1  1.25  1.19  0
France  17588  5.50  0  0  3  0.47  1.01  0
Austria  17433  6.00  0  3  2  0.61  1.25  0
Netherlands  16744  6.00  0  2  2  0.55  1.10  1
Canada  16243  6.00  1  1  5  0.44  0.62  1
Belgium  16104  6.00  0  2  0  0.15  1.07  0
Italy  14783  5.00  0  2  1  0.39  0.72  0
Australia  13873  6.00  1  1  4  0.41  0.73  1
United Kingdom  13067  5.31  1  4  5  0.50  1.13  1
4 Industry-level  data may suffer  from the opposite  bias:  many of the firms  included  in industry  statistics  are
very small  and would  not qualify  for significant  external  financing  under any financial  system.  See Rajan
and Zingales  (1999)  discussion  of European  data.
10Ireland  12034  5.00  1  1  4  0.62  0.36  0
Singapore  11707  5.19  1  4  4  0.47  0.93  1
New Zealand  11332  6.00  1  3  4  0.25  0.76  0
Israel  9787  3.31  1  4  3  0.65  0.95  0
Hong Kong  9565  4.69  1  4  5  0.50  1.49  1
Spain  9506  5.00  0  2  4  0.57  0.95  0
Greece  5257  4.25  0  1  2  0.30  0.42  0
Korea  4785  3.69  0  3  2  1.21  0.53  1
Portugal  4620  5.19  0  1  3  0.33  0.76  0
Argentina  3623  3.56  0  1  4  0.36  0.21  0
Malaysia  2708  3.69  1  4  4  0.44  0.79  1
South Africa  2287  2.69  1  3  5  0.08  0.63  0
Chile  2243  4.19  0  2  5  0.10  0.46  1
Brazil  2034  3.75  0  1  3  0.55  0.32  1
Mexico  1824  3.00  0  0  1  0.41  0.22  1
Turkey  1626  3.19  0  2  2  0.86  0.19  1
Thailand  1517  4.31  1  3  2  0.77  0.77  1
Colombia  1321  1.19  0  0  3  0.09  0.17  0
Peru  775  1.69  0  0  3  0.30  0.11  I
Philippines  619  2.13  0  0  3  0.26  0.34  1
Indonesia  610  3.00  0  4  2  0.40  0.45  0
India  405  2.50  1  4  5  0.40  0.34  0
Pakistan  319  1.88  1  4  5  0.29  0.36  0
As an indicator of the ability of finns to enter into financial contracts we use a
commercial  index of experts' evaluations of the efficiency of the state in enforcing
property rights within each country. This measure, produced by the International Country
Risk rating agency, reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to
accept the established institutions to make and  implement laws and adjudicate disputes.
It is scored on a zero to six scale, with higher scores indicating sound political institutions
and a strong court system. Lower scores indicate a tradition of depending on physical
force or illegal means to settle claims. This indicator has been used in previous studies
comparing institutions in different countries (e.g.,  Knack and Keefer (1995), Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)).
We place more weight on this indicator than on a comparison of specific differences in
the legal codes across countries. Such a comparison may be misleading, because firms
may be able to compensate for the absence of specific legal protections by altering the
11provisions of contracts. It is likely to be more difficult to compensate for the systemic
failures of the legal system to adjudicate claims captured by the law and order indicator.
In Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), we show that the index is a good predictor of
the use of long-term debt by large firms in our sample of countries. By contrast, we find
less evidence that the indicators of specific legal protections identified by LLSV predict
the use of long-term debt. However, for completeness we also present  indicators
obtained by LLSV.  Common Law Dummy takes the value one for common law
countries and the value zero for others. As argued by LLSV, common law legal systems
are more likely to offer protections to outside investors than civil law systems. Creditor
rights is an index that ranges from 0 to 4 and aggregates creditor rights, and shareholder
rights is an index that ranges from 0 to 5  and aggregates shareholder rights as described
in the text. The creditor and shareholder rights variables are described in LLSV.
Table 1 shows that our sample contains countries with legal systems of very diverse
levels of effectiveness. It contains highly effective common law legal systems (such as
the United States and Canada) and less effective legal systems (such as India and
Pakistan), as well as highly effective civil systems (such as Switzerland)  and less
effective systems such as those in Columbia and Peru.
For each country we also present three indicators of financial system development.  As an
indicator of whether the financial system is bank-based or market-based we use a dummy
variable, MARKET1, defined in Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999). The variable
classifies countries as being market-based when they have larger, more active and
efficient stock markets compared to banks. 5
5 Market  I is a dummy  that  takes  the  value  I for  higher  than  mean  values  of an aggregate  Structure  index.
Structure  index  is the  means-removed  average  of relative  size,  relative  activity  and  relative  efficiency
12We also present two other measures of the development of the market and the banking
sector separately. Turnover, TOR, is the total value of shares traded in the stock exchange
divided by market capitalization. Stock market data are from IFC's Emerging Market
Data Base. 6 Bank/GDP is the total assets of the deposit money banks divided by GDP.  It
is obtained from IMF, International Financial Statistics. Both variables have been used in
our previous firm-level studies (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998, 1999).
Countries scoring high on TOR include East Asian economies which were experiencing a
market boom at this time, and the United States and the United Kingdom. Countries with
low scrores include Latin American countries such as Chile and Columbia, and Peru, as
well as European countries such as Greece and Portugal. Countries with a large banking
sector include Switzerland, Japan, Germany and Hong Kong, whereas Mexico, Turkey
and Columbia have small banking sectors relative to their GDP.
3.2 Measures  of firm growth
To measure whether firms' growth in an economy is financially constrained we adopt the
approach of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). For each firm in an economy we
estimate a rate at which it can grow, relying only on its internal funds or on short-term
borrowing. We then compute the proportion of firms that grow at rates that exceed each
of these two estimated rates each year. We then examine whether the proportions of firms
growing faster than each of the two estimated rates differ between bank-based and
measures. Relative  size is given by the ratio of stock  market  capitalization  to total  assets  of deposit  money
banks;  relative  activity  is defined  as the total  value of stocks  traded  divided  by bank credit to the private
sector;  and finally  relative  efficiency  is given  by the product  of total  value  traded  on the stock market  and
average  overhead  costs of banks in the country. See Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine  (1999)  for a discussion  of
alternative  ways of defining  market-based  and  bank-based  systems.
6An  alternative  measure,  used in Levine  (2000),  is the ratio of total  value  traded  to GDP. Since  our sample
consists  of firms that are already  listed  on the stock exchange,  the ratio of value  traded  to market
capitalization  provides  a measure  of the activity  levels  of the financial  markets  that is more relevant  to
these firms.
13market-based financial systems, and whether they are affected by the level of
development of the legal system.
Our estimate of the firm's growth rate is based on the standard "percentage of sales"
financial planning model (Higgins (1974)).  This model relates a firm's growth rate to its
need for external funds. The external financing need at time t of a firm growing at g,
percent a year is given by
EFN, =g, * Assets, -(1 + g,) *Earningst * b(1)
where EFNt  is the external financing need and bt is the proportion of the firm's earnings
that are retained for reinvestment at time t. Earnings are calculated after interest and
taxes. The first term on the right-hand side is the required investment for a firm growing
at g, percent. The second term is the internally available capital for investment, taking the
firm's retention ratio as given.
The financial planning model makes several implicit assumptions about the
relation between the firm's  growth rate and the EFN,. First, the ratio of assets used in
production to sales is assumed to be constant. Thus, the required total investment
increases in proportion to the firm's growth in sales. Second, the firm's profit rate per
unit of sales is constant. 7 Third, we assume that the economic depreciation of existing
assets equals that reported in the financial statements.
We use two  estimates of each firm's attainable growth rate. The internally
financed growth rate IG, is the maximum growth rate that can be financed  if a firm relies
only on its internal resources and maintains its dividend. It is obtained by assuming that
7  This assumption was examined in Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). The results in that paper were
not sensitive to different assumptions about the rate of return on marginal sales.
14the firm retains all its earnings (i.e., bt =1), equating EFNt to zero and solving (1) for gt,
and is given by
IGt =ROA,/(J- ROAd,
where ROAt is the firm's  return on assets, or the ratio of earnings after taxes and interest
to total assets. IG, is increasing in the firm's return on assets. Thus, more profitable firms
can finance higher growth rates internally.
The short-term financed growth rate SGR, is an estimate of the maximum growth rate that
can be attained if the firm uses only short-term external financing. It is obtained by using
only the value of assets that are not financed by new short-term credit in place of total
assets in equation (1). The assets not financed by short-term debt are termed "long-term
capital"  ROLTCt and are obtained by multiplying total assets by one minus the ratio of
short-term liabilities to total assets. More specifically, SFGt is given by
SFGt =ROLTC/(J- ROLTCd.
The use of the current realized ratio of short-term borrowing to assets to calculate SFGt
ensures that the estimate is feasible, and does not assume levels of short-term credit that
are so costly that firms would not choose them.
The estimates of IGt and SFGt are conservative in several ways. First, each
estimated maximum growth rate assumes that a firm utilizes the unconstrained sources of
finance no more intensively than it is currently doing. 8 Second, firms with spare capacity
do not need to invest and may grow at a faster rate than predicted by the financial
planning model. We attempt to mitigate the potential problem posed by spare capacity by
using each firm' s maximum constrained growth rates averaged over the second half of
8 In the case of IG  the unconstrained  source  of finance  is trade credit.  In the calculation  of SFG the
unconstrained  sources  are trade credit  and short-term  borrowing.
15the sample period in our tests below. Third, the financial planning model abstracts from
technical advances that reduce the requirements for investment capital. Thus, it may
overstate the cost of growth and underestimate the maximum growth rate attainable using
unconstrained sources of finance.
For each country in the sample we compute the proportion of firms whose mean annual
real growth rate of sales exceeds the means of the two maximum constrained growth rates
defined above. Thus, taking IG as an example, for each firm f in each country c and for
each year t we estimate IGfc,  We form a dummy variable for each firm f which takes on
the value  one if  the firm inflation-adjusted realized growth rate exceeds the predicted
rate, and zero otherwise: dfct=l  if gfct>  IGfc and is 0 otherwise. Finally, for each country
and each year we obtain STCOUNTC, the proportion of firms that grow at average rates
exceeding the IGfc, rate in year t, Ef dfclnct, where nt  is the number of firms  in each
country in year t.  We repeat the same calculations with SFG in place of IG to  obtain
LTCOUNT,t the proportion of firms that grow at average rates exceeding the SFGfc,  rate
in year t. Thus, LTCOUNTc, is an estimate of the proportion of firms that obtain long-
term financing (debt and/or equity), by issuing public or privately placed securities or by
borrowing from the financial sector.
Our final variable is DCOUNTC, the proportion of firms in a country that grow at a rate
that exceeds IG 1 but does not exceed SFG,. Thus, this variable measures the proportion of
firms that have access to short-term financing, but not necessarily access to  long-term
financing. Thus, DCOUNT proxies for the relative availability of  short-term financing
compared to the availability of long-term financing.
16Table 2
Firm Characteristics
LTCOUNT  is the proportion  of firms in a country  whose  mean  growth  of real sales  exceeds  their mean  maximum  short-term
financed  growth rate (SFG).  STCOUNT  is the proportion  of firms whose  mean  growth of real sales exceeds  their mean
internally  financed  growth  rate (IG). DCOUNT  is given  by (STCOUNT-LTCOUNT)/STCOUNT.  NFATA  is the net fixed
assets  divided  by total assets.  NSNFA  is the net sales  divided  by net fixed  assets.  SIZE is  the total assets  of the firm divided
by the GDP  of the country.  The data  set, obtained  from  WorldScope,  consists  of 45,598  annual  firm level  observations  over
the period 1989-1996. These are the largest  publicly  traded manufacturing  films in 40 countries.  All values  are 1989-96
averages.
LTCOUNT  STCOUNT  Y  NFATA  NSNFA  SIZE
Argentina  0.41  0.45  0.11  0.49  2.36  2.60
Australia  0.44  0.49  0.13  0.36  3.88  2.90
Austria  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.30  4.87  2.57
Belgium  0.52  0.58  0.11  0.27  5.39  3.65
Brazil  0.42  0.43  0.01  0.56  1.63  3.34
Canada  0.53  0.57  0.07  0.39  4.51  1.66
Chile  0.30  0.38  0.34  0.52  1.60  8.62
Colombia  0.24  0.26  0.14  0.29  3.04  9.20
Denmark  0.42  0.50  0.17  0.36  4.07  1.96
Finland  0.51  0.57  0.11  0.36  4.01  13.60
France  0.41  0.50  0,20  0.22  6.79  1.75
Germany  0.91  0.93  0.02  0.29  6.35  0.67
Greece  0.35  0.45  0.25  0.33  4.11  1.13
Hong  Kong  0.47  0.49  0.06  0.38  2.84  5.77
Indonesia  0.50  0.59  0.15  0.39  3.33  1.30
Indonesia  0.43  0.59  0.29  0.41  3.41  0.80
Ireland  0.40  0.52  0.21  0.38  3.47  11.90
Israel  0.68  0.75  0.12  0.30  4.64  6.46
Italy  0.42  0.48  0.12  0.26  4.87  0.99
Japan  0.48  0.55  0.14  0.29  4.02  0.35
Korea  0.69  0.75  0.08  0.39  2.66  4.92
Malaysia  0.51  0.58  0.14  0.46  2.26  3.60
Mexico  0.49  0.53  0.09  0.61  1.37  3.81
Netherlands  0.37  0.47  0.23  0.38  4.56  3.76
New  Zealand  0.40  0.42  0.04  0.39  3.44  11.60
Norway  0.46  0.51  0.12  0.31  5.53  5.74
Pakistan  0.28  0.39  0.28  0.37  8.66  0.75
Peru  0.46  0.50  0.10  0.53  1.83  2.30
Philippines  0.28  0.34  0.17  0.44  2.84  2.50
Portugal  0.47  0.51  0.09  0.44  2.76  2.56
Singapore  0.46  0.55  0.19  0.34  3.37  7.62
SouthAfrica  0.11  0.20  0.51  0.35  6.13  5.39
Spain  0.37  0.42  0.17  0.39  3.69  1.41
Sweden  0.44  0.52  0.18  0.33  4.16  7.68
Switzerland  0.48  0.53  0.12  0.37  3.81  8.36
Taiwan  0.37  0.47  0.21  0.40  2.29  5.85
Thailand  0.32  0.48  0.35  0.43  3.10  1.34
Turkey  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.33  6.03  2.39
United Kingdom  0.35  0.44  0.26  0.36  4.85  0.62
United  States  0.46  0.51  0.11  0.29  6.20  0.17
17Table  2  shows  the  country  averages  for  LTCOUNTC,I, STCOUNTIt  and
DCOUNTC,. The table also presents three descriptors of the firmns  in each country: The
net fixed assets divided by total assets NFATA, the net sales divided by net fixed assets
NSNFA, and SIZE, the total assets of the firm divided by the GDP of  the country.
The table shows interesting variation in the proportion of firms obtaining external
financing.  Thus, for example, approximately half the US firms in our sample grow at
rates exceeding IGt, but only 20% of the South African firms do so.
The variation  in the  proportion of  firms  obtaining  external  financing  may  be
driven by differences in legal and financial systems.  However, they may also be caused
by differences in firm characteristics.  For example, firms with a higher average ratio of
net fixed assets to total assets may require more long term financing than firms with  a
lower ratio. This may be one of the reasons why we observe a relatively high LTCOUNT
for a country like Peru. Also firms that are larger relative to their economy may enjoy
better access to the available external financing than smaller firms in the same country.
To the extent that the firms in our sample from the less developed economies are larger
relative to  their economy than firms in more developed economies, Table 2 overstates
access to external financing in less developed economies. Finally, inflation adjustment in
calculating real sales growth may lead to additional problems in high inflation countries,
as in the case of Turkey.  In our regressions, we try to control for firm characteristics and
macro variables.  We also test the sensitivity results to outliers.
183.3 Summary Statistics
We treat each date/country combination as a separate observation and analyze the




LTCOUNT is the proportion of firms in a country whose mean growth of real sales exceeds their mean maximum short-term
financed growth rate (SFG).  STCOUNT is the proportion of firms whose mean growth of real sales exceeds their mean
internally financed growth rate  (IG). DCOUNT is given by (STCOUNT-LTCOUNT)/STCOUNT. LAW & ORDER, scored
1 to 6,  is an indicator of the degree to which the citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing legal system to mediate
disputes and enforce contracts.  GROWTH is the growth rate of the real GDP per capita. INFLATION is the inflation rate of
the GDP deflator. SIZE is given by total assets divided by country GDP. NFATA is the net fixed assets divided by total
assets. NSNFA is net sales divided by net fixed assets. MARKET is a dummy variable that takes the value I for values of
TOR/(BANK/GDP) that are higher than the sample median and 0 otherwise. COMMON is a dummy that takes the value  I
for common law countries and the value zero for others. BANK/GDP is the total assets of the deposit money banks divided
by  GDP. TOR is  stock market turnover  defined as  the  total value  of  shares traded  divided by  market capitalization.
GDP/CAP is the real GDP per capita in thousands of US$. All country level variables are annual figures, averaged over the
1989-1996 period. All firm-level variables are averaged over firms in each country and over  the 1989-1996 period.  Panel A
presents the summary statistics for the countries listed in Table I.  Panel B reports correlation coefficients.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
N  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum
LTCOUNT  389  0.467  0.279  0  1
STCOUNT  389  0.531  0.260  0  1
DCOUNT  383  0.152  0.176  0  1
LAW & ORDER  336  4.546  1.579  1  6
GROWTH  388  0.026  0.036  -0.135  0.114
INFLATION  417  0.170  0.511  -0.001  4.328
SIZE  407  0.007  0.023  0.000  0.199
NFATA  411  0.376  0.093  0.151  1
NSNFA  394  3.929  1.963  1.000  19.627
MARKET  387  0.501  0.501  0  1
COMMON  420  0.333  0.472  0  1
BANK/GDP  405  0.722  0.397  0.058  1.818
TOR  402  0.552  0.607  0.004  5.277
GDP/CAP  396  10.165  8.187  0.242  27.828
19Panel B: Correlation  Matrix
LTCOUNT  STCOUNT  DCOUNT  LAW  GROWTH  INFL.  SIZE  NFATA  NSNFA  MARKET  COMMON  BANK/  TOR
GDP
STCOUNT  .964***
DCOUNT  -.570***  -0.380***
LAW  .178***  0.161***  -.243***
GROWTH  .145***  .194***  .006  .058
INFLATION  .051  .008  -.140**  -.313***  -.155***
SIZE  .101**  .073  -.123**  .150***  .059  -.041
NFATA  -.126**  -.151***  -.028  -.335***  -.002  .423***  -.005
NSNFA  .053  .089*  .145***  .083  -.130***  -.222***  -.165***  -.672***
MARKET  .069  .092*  -.018  -.223***  .147***  .140***  -.156***  .177***  -.114**
COMMON  -.145***  -.106*  .171***  -.035  .003  -.154***  -.087*  -.009  -.162***  -.085*
BANK/GDP  .078  .075  -.045  .552***  -.024  -.321***  -.090*  -.354***  .143***  -.258***  -.019
TOR  .077  .113**  .005  .109*  .119**  -.048  -.131***  -.013  -.029  .460***  -.108**  .307***
GDP/CAP  .157***  .143***  -.161***  .774***  -.093*  -.279***  .192***  -.501***  .299***  -.188***  -.099**  .609***  .052
** and ***  indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and I percent respectively.
20The correlation matrix is presented in Panel B. Inspection of Panel B shows that
the measures of the availability of external financing  LTCOUNT and  STCOUNT are
highly positively correlated with the level of development of the legal system.  Consistent
with Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), a larger proportion of firms in countries
with good legal systems grow at rates requiring external financing. More firms also use
external financing in economies that are growing fast, and in economies with higher per
capita incomes.
The firm characteristics associated with external financing are firm size and a low
ratio  of  net  fixed assets  to  total  assets.  However,  the  interpretation of  the  pairwise
correlation is unclear. The ratio of net fixed assets to total  assets is highly negatively
correlated with the efficiency of the legal system, the GDP per capita and with the size of
the banking system, and highly positively correlated with the inflation rate.
The pairwise correlations between LTCOUNT and STCOUNT and our descriptors
of financial structure are weak.  STCOUNT is positively related to TOR and to MARKET,
a  dummy variable which  takes  a value  of  1 when the  ratio of  TOR to  BANK/GDP
exceeds the sample median, and zero otherwise. However, LTCOUNT is not significantly
correlated  with  either.  BANK/GDP  is not  significantly correlated  with  STCOUNT  or
LTCOUNT.
DCOUNT is strongly negatively correlated with LAW and GDP per capita. Thus,
in countries with efficient legal systems and high incomes, a smaller proportion of firms
has access to  short-term financing but  grows at rates below those requiring long-term
21financing. By contrast, in countries in which firms have a high ratio of sales to assets,
firms are more likely to rely on short-term rather than long-term financing. 9
An interesting finding is that the firmns  in our sample in common law countries are
less likely to grow at rates requiring external financing than firms in civil law countries.
A positive correlation between DCOUNT and the common law dummy also suggests that
in common law countries a larger proportion of firms that require external financing grow
at rates that do not require access to long-term financing.
The pairwise correlation results must be interpreted with caution. Inspection of
Panel B shows that in our sample the average firm in countries where the legal system is
efficient and in civil law countries is larger relative to its country's GDP then the average
firm in countries where the legal system is less efficient and in common law countries.
Firm descriptors NFATA and NSNFA are also correlated with the efficiency of the legal
system and legal origin. We control for those firm effects in our multivariate analysis.
4. EXCESS GROWTH OF FIRMS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
We analyze the effect of a country's  financial system on firm growth in three
stages.  First,  we  regress  our  fmancial system  indicators,  TOR  and  BANK/GDP  on
descriptors of the contracting environment. These regressions yield the estimates of the
securities markets activity level and the size of the banking sector predicted by the level
of  development and  characteristics of the  legal system.  We next regress  our excess
growth variables STCOtNT,  LTCOUNT and DCOUNT on these predicted values, and
on  control  variables.  These  regressions  allow  us  to  test  whether  the  legal  system
9 Inflation is also negatively correlated with DCOUNT. However, in view of the potential effect of inflation
on firn  growth rates we treat inflation as a control variable in the regressions and do not interpret it
directly.
22influences excess growth by affecting the development of the financial system. Finally,
we augment these regressions by  indicators of the relative  development of the stock
markets to the banking system. These regressions allow us to test whether market-based
or bank-based systems perform differently.
We instrument for TOR and BANKIGDP variables used in the second stage using
variables  that proxy  for the  contracting environment in each  country. This  choice  is
motivated by the hypotheses that the development of the legal system can be taken as
exogenous and that financial system development depends primarily on the  ability of
investors or financial intermediaries on one hand, and firms, on the other hand, to enter
into effective contracts.
We use the LAW&ORDER indicator of legal effectiveness as a proxy  for the
contracting environment. As suggested by LLSV we also use a legal origin variable, the
common law dummy, and the specific indices of shareholder and creditor rights. Finally,
as a proxy for the ability to enter into financial contracts, we use the rate of inflation.
In the second stage we regress the dependent variables on the predicted values of
TOR and  BANK/GDP  and  several control variables.  In the  case of  STCOUNT,  for
example, the estimated equation is
STCOUNT = 71  +  2TOR + Y3  BANK/GDP +y4 GROWTH  75 INFLATION +
76  SIZE + 77 GDP/CAP + 78 LAW & ORDER+E
We interpret these predicted financial sector variables as the stock-market activity
levels  and the  size of the banking sector that is predicted by  a  country's  contracting
environment, respectively. We also include LAW & ORDER separately, to test for the
additional  channels,  independent  of  the  financial  system,  by  which  the  contracting
environment may affect the firms' access to financing.
23We also include several control variables.'0 We include GROWTH to control for
the possibility that  the firms'  desire to  grow at rates that  require  external financing
depends on the rate of growth of the economy. 1'  We also include INFLATION to control
for the possibility that in economies with high inflation the growth rates of firms will be
overstated.
We also include two additional control variables. SIZE measures the average size
of the firms in each country as a proportion of their GDP. We hypothesize that large
firms have more access to the country's  financial markets and  institutions. Thus, this
variable controls for the differences in sample selection across countries.
There may exist differences in access to financing that are related to the level of
development but  not  specifically related to the development of the legal  system.  We
include GDP per capita in the equation to serve as a proxy for these differences.
Our regression is estimated as a year-country unbalanced panel using a random
effects estimator. This methodology allows us to include dummy variables, which  are
constant  across  countries  in  our  specifications.  The  use  of  random  effects  panel
estimators is also indicated when the explanatory variables are subject to measurement
error (Moulton (1987)).
10  Additional  firm-specific  variables  NFATA  and  NSNFA  were included  in  unreported  runs.  They  were not
significant  and did not affect  the reported  results.
" If the economy is growing fast, the rate of profit is likely to be high. This will also tend to increase the
rates IG and SGR, permitting faster growth without access to external financing. The variable GROWTH
allows for the possibility of additional effects of the growth in the economy.
24Table 4
Excess Growth of Firms and Financial Structure
Panel A: Constraints  on Short-Term  and Long-Term  Debt --  The regression  equation estimated  is:
STCOUNT = V +  3,TOR  + 32  BANK/GDP +3 3 GROWTH +3 4 INFLATION + 35 SIZE + E 6 GDP/CAP + 37 LAW & ORDER + 3s
MARKET + 39ETOR  +  310E  BANK/GDP  +,.  The sample consists of 45,598 manufacturing firms in 40countries over the period 1989-1996.
Firm level variables are averaged for each country, each year. Dependent variable is the proportion of firms whose mean growth of real
sales exceeds their mean internally financed growth rate (IG). TOR is stock market turnover defined as the total value of shares divided
by market capitalization. BANK/GDP is the total assets of the deposit money banks divided by GDP. GROWTH is the growth rate of
the real GDP per capital.  INFLATION is the inflation rate of the GDP deflator. SIZE is total assets of firms divided by GDP of the
country, in thousands.  GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in thousands of US$. NFATA is net fixed assets divided by total assets.  LAW
& ORDER, scored 1 to 6, is an indicator of the degree to which citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing  legal system to
mediate disputes and enforce contracts.  MARKET is a dummy variable that takes the value I for values of TOR/(BANKIGDP) that are
higher than the sample median and 0 otherwise.  TOR and BANK/GDP used in estimation are the predicted values obtained from the
following  regressions:  TOR = V +  3, LAW & ORDER + 32 COMMON-LAW DUMMY + 33 INFLATION + 34 SHARE HOLDER
RIGHTS + , and  BANK/GDP = V +  3,  LAW & ORDER + 32 COMMON-LAW DUMMY +  33 INFLATION +  34 CREDITOR
RIGHTS +  ,.  SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS is  an index that ranges from 0  to 5  and aggregates shareholder  rights  and CREDITOR
RIGHTS is an index that ranges from 0 to 4.5 and aggregates creditor rights as described in the text. COMMON- LAW DUMMY takes
the value  I for common  law countries and the value  zero for others. ETOR  and EBAM4KoDp  are residuals from the above regressions.
Regressions are estimated using panel data with random effects. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
(1)  (2)  (3)
CONS.  -.082  -.068  -.060
(.185)  (.174)  (.162)
TOR  .735**  .692***  .720***
(.220)  (.291)  (.266)
BANK/GDP  .357*  .376**  .327*
(.220)  (.206)  (.192)
GROWTH  1.702***  1.589***  1.425***
(.468)  (.479)  (.482)
INFLATION  .061**  .094***  .087
(.032)  (.032)  (.033)
SIZE  2.475  .216  -.838
(6.125)  (5.947)  (5.584)
GDP/CAP  .001  .002  .005
(.004)  (.004)  (.004)
LAW & ORDER  -.019  -.024  -.024
(.023)  (.022)  (.021)
MARKET  .026
(.034)
E BANK/GDP  -.130*
(.079)
E TOR  .046
(.055)
R 2 within  .06  .07  .06
R 2 between  .24  .25  .32
No. of  283  267  267
Observations
*  *  and ***  indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
25Panel  B:  Constraints  on Long-Term  Debt  --  The regression equation estimated is: LTCOUNT =V +El  3,TOR + 32
BANK/GDP +33 GROWTH  +34 INFLATION +  35 SIZE + 36 GDP/CAP  +  3,  LAW &  ORDER  + 3. MARKET +  39 ETOR +  3B,IE
BANK/GDP  +  . The sample consists of 45,598 manufacturing firms in 40 countries over the period 1989-1996.  Firm level variables are
averaged for  each country, each year. Dependent variable is  the proportion of firms in  a country whose mean  growth of real  sales
exceeds their mean maximum short-term financed growth rate (SFG).  TOR is stock market turnover defined as the total value of shares
divided by market capitalization. BANK/GDP is the total assets of the deposit money banks divided by GDP. GROWTH is the growth
rate of the real GDP per capital.  INFLATION is the inflation rate of the GDP deflator. SIZE is total assets of firms divided by GDP of
the country, in thousands.  GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in thousands of US$. NFATA is net fixed assets divided by total assets.
LAW & ORDER, scored 1 to 6, is an indicator of the degree to which citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing legal system
to mediate disputes and enforce contracts.  MARKET is a dummy variable that takes the value I for values of TOR/(BANK/GDP) that
are higher than the sample median and 0 otherwise.  TOR and BANKIGDP used in estimation are the predicted values obtained from
the following  regressions:  TOR = V +  3,  LAW & ORDER + 32 COMMON-LAW DUMMY + 33 INFLATION +  34 SHARE
HOLDER  RIGHTS +,  and  BANK/GDP = V +  31 LAW & ORDER + 32 COMMON-LAW DUMMY +  33 INFLATION + 34
CREDITOR RIGHTS + ,.  SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS  is an index that ranges from 0 to  5 and aggregates  shareholder  rights  and
CREDITOR RIGHTS is an index that ranges from 0 to 4.5 and aggregates creditor rights as described in the text.  COMMON- LAW
DUMMY takes the value  I for common law countries and the value zero for others. ETOR  and EBANKIGDP  are residuals from the above
regressions.  Regressions are estimated using panel data with random effects. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
(1)  (2)  (3)
CONS.  -.176  -.133  -.144
(.208)  (.200)  (.184)
TOR  .843***  .819***  .830***
(.360)  (.338)  (.307)
BANK/GDP  .261  .230  .202
(.249)  (.237)  (.220)
GROWTH  1.738***  1.704***  1.517***
(.496)  (.510)  (.514)
INFLATION  .089***  .124***  .118***
(.034)  (.036)  (.035)
SIZE  3.904  1.864  .866
(6.789)  (6.728)  (6.305)
GDP/CAP  .001  .002  .006
(.005)  (.005)  (.005)
LAW & ORDER  -.014  -.018  -.019
(.024)  (.024)  (.023)
MARKET  .011
(.037)
E  BANK/GDP  -. 137*
(.089)
E TOR  .024
(.060)
R2  within  .07  .08  .08
R 2 between  .19  .18  .25
No. of  283  267  261
Observations
**  and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and I percent respectively.
26Panel C:  Proportion Long-Term Constrained - The equation  estimated  is: DCOUNT  = V +  31TOR + 32
BANK/GDP  +33  GROWTH  +34  INFLATION  + 35  SIZE + 36GDP/CAP  + 37 LAW & ORDER  + 3s  MARKET  + 3 9 ETOR  + 310E
BANKp + ,.  The sample  consists  of 45,599  manufacturing  firms in 40 countries  over  the period 1989-1996. Firm level  variables  are
averaged  for each country,  each  year.  Dependent  variable  is given  by (STCOUNT-LTCOUNT)/STCOUNT,  the proportion  of firms  in a
country  that grow at a rate that exceeds (IG) but does not exceed  (SFG).  TOR is stock  market  turnover  defined  as the total value of
shares divided  by market  capitalization.  BANK/GDP  is  the total  assets  of the deposit  money  banks  divided  by GDP.  GROWTH  is the
growth  rate of the real GDP per capital. INFLATION  is the inflation  rate of the GDP  deflator.  SIZE  is total assets  divided  by GDP  of
the country,  in thousands. GDP/CAP  is real GDP  per capita in thousands  of US$.  NFATA  is net fixed assets  divided  by total assets.
LAW & ORDER,  scored I to 6, is an indicator  of the degree  to which  citizens  of a country  are able  to utilize  the existing  legal system
to mediate  disputes  and enforce  contracts.  MARKET  is a dummy  variable  that takes  the value I for values  of TOR/(BANKI/GDP)  that
are higher  than the sample  median and 0 otherwise. TOR  and BANK/GDP  used in estimation  are the predicted  values obtained  from
the following regressions: TOR = V +  31 LAW & ORDER  + 32 COMMON-LAW  DUMMY  + 33 INFLATION  + 34 $HARE
HOLDER RIGHTS  +,  and  BANK/GDP  = V +  3I LAW  & ORDER  + 32 COMMON-LAW  DUMMY  +  33INFLATION  + 34
CREDITOR  RIGHTS  + ,.  SHAREHOLDER  RIGHTS  is an index  that ranges from 0 to 5 and aggregates  shareholder  rights and
CREDITOR  RIGHTS  is an index that ranges from 0 to 4.5 and aggregates  creditor  rights  as described  in the text. COMMON-  LAW
DUMMY  takes the value I for common  law countries  and the value zero for others.  ETR  and EBANy;oop  are residuals  from the above
regressions.  Regressions  are estimated  using panel  data  with  random  effects.  Standard  errors  are given  in parentheses.
(1)  (2)  (3)
CONS.  .465***  .343***  .346***
(.131)  (.119)  (.118)
TOR  -. 411**  -. 400**  -. 403**
(.224)  (.197)  (.196)
BANK/GDP  .148  .231*  .234*
(.156)  (.140)  (.140)
GROWTH  -.674**  -.557*  -.542*
(.332)  (.313)  (.317)
INFLATION  -.084***  -.076***  -. 075***
(.024)  (.022)  (.022)
SIZE  -.981  -.853  -.875
(4.314)  (3.985)  (3.974)
GDP/CAP  .002  -.000  -001
(.003)  (.003)  (.003)
LAW &ORDER  -.038***  -.024*  -.023*
(.016)  (.014)  (.014)
MARKET  -.001
(.023)
E BANK/GDP  .020
(.056)
E TOR  -.000
(.037)
R 2 within  .08  .07  .06
R 2 between  .25  .24  .25
No. of  279  264  264
Observations
**  and***  indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
27Table 4 presents the second-stage regression results. In Panel A the dependent
variable is STCOUNT. Thus, the panel investigates the proportion of the firms in each
country growing at a rate that requires external financing. The basic specification is given
in equation (1).
The proportion of firms growing at rates requiring outside financing is higher in
countries with high predicted TOR and BANK/GDP. Thus, a larger proportion of firms
obtain  outside  financing  when  the  contracting  environment  is  conducive  to  the
development of a large banking sector and an active stock market. This is in line with the
implications of previous studies. The two control variables GROWTH and INFLATION
are also significantly positive.
We do not  identify any effects of average firm size relative to  GDP or  of the
general level of development measured by GDP per capita on financing. We also do not
identify any additional effects of the efficiency of the legal system not already accounted
for in the development of the financial system.
Specification (2) augments the equation with a variable which takes the value one
for  those  observations where  the  ratio  of TOR  to  BANK/GDP exceeds  the  sample
median, and  zero otherwise. The MARKET dummy identifies market-based economic
environments. Inspection of specification (2) reveals that there is no evidence that the
relative ratio of market activity to the size of the banking sector affects the proportion of
firms that obtain external financing.
In  the  specification  (3)  we  augment  the  basic  estimating equation  with  the
residuals from the first-stage regressions. ETOR  is the component of the market activity
level not predicted by the legal environment. EBANK/GDP  is the difference between the
28ratio  of  actual  BANK/GDP  and  the  level  BANK/GDP  predicted  by  the  country's
contracting  environment.  Positive coefficients  for these  variables  would  suggest that
there  is  a  benefit  to  market  activity  and  or  a  large  banking  sector  respectively,
independently of the legal system.
The coefficients of ETOR and EBANKJGDP are not  significant at the five percent
level, suggesting that there is little identifiable benefit to having a larger financial sector
than  that  predicted by  the  legal  contracting  environment.  If  anything,  the  marginal
significance of EBANK/GDP  hints that an overexpansion of the banking sector beyond the
predicted level may be evidence that resources are being misallocated.  However, this
result is sensitive to outliers in our sample. If we drop countries such as Peru and Turkey
from  the  estimation,  EBANK1GDP  is  not  even  marginally  significant  and  BANK/GDP
becomes significant at five percent in all specifications.
Panel B presents  analogous regressions for LTCOUNT.  Thus  in this  panel  we
explain the proportion of firms growing at rates that require additional long-term external
financing. The results in Panel B are analogous to those presented in Panel A, with one
exception. The coefficient for BANK/GDP, while remaining positive throughout, is no
longer statistically significant.12 Thus, we find less evidence that the size of the banking
sector is an important determinant of the availability of long-term financing for the firms
in our sample. This is consistent with the lack of significance of the MARKET indicator in
specification (2).
The  dependent  variable in  Panel C is  DCOUNT, the proportion  of  firms  that
obtain  external financing  but  do  not  grow at rates  that  require  additional  long-term
12 Dropping outliers does not make BANK/GDP significant in LTCOUNT regressions although
EBANUKGDP  loses significance as in STCOUNT regressions..
29capital. This proportion is likely to be high when the financial system is able to supply
short-term financing efficiently, but is not able to supply long-term financing.
Inspection  of  all  three  specifications  in  Panel  C  shows  that  DCOUNT  is
negatively  related to  TOR  and  positively  related to  BANK/GDP.  Firms  that  require
external financing in economies with strong securities markets are more likely to obtain
long-term financing. By contrast, firms that require external financing in economies with
a strong banking sector are less likely to grow at rates that require long-term financing.
This is consistent with the notion that well-developed securities markets facilitate long-
term financing, whereas a well-developed banking sector facilitates short-term financing.
Interestingly, LA W&ORDER also has a strong negative effect on DCOUNT independent
of its  effect through  TOR.  13  The financial structure variables MARKET, of ETOR  and
EBANKIGDP are again not significant.
The  coefficients  of  the  control  variables  GROWTH  and  INFLATION  are
significant in the expected directions.  In high-growth economies a larger proportion of
firns  requiring  external  financing grows  at rates that  require long-term  financing.  In
economies  with high  inflation rates, a higher  proportion of externally  financed  firms
grows at rate that exceeds the predicted rates IG and SFG.
We also investigated possible nonlinearities in the way financial variables may
affect  firm growth  rates  by  including  squared  TOR and  BANK/GDP  terms  into  all
specifications in Table 4.  The squared TOR and BANK/GDP terms enter the DCOUNT
regressions  significantly  with  positive  and  negative  signs,  respectively.  TOR  and
BANK/GDP terms also remain significant with their initial signs.  This indicates that the
positive  impact  of  bank  development  on  short  term  financing  and  stock  market
30development on long term financing are especially important at lower levels of financial
development. 14
This  finding  raises  the  possibility  that  relative  development  of  banks  versus
markets may be particularly important at lower levels of development.  To test this, we
added an interaction term of  MARKET with GDP per capita to specification (2) in all
panels  of Table 4.  However, this variable failed to  develop a  significant coefficient.
Another possibility  is that  financial structure is only important if  the underlying legal
structure  is  inadequate.  This  may  be  true since markets  in  general  require  a  better
developed  legal  system  to  function  efficiently.  However  an  interaction  term  of
MARKET with LAW & ORDER variable does not develop a significant sign in any of
the regressions in Table 4.
In sum, Table 4 yields several results:
First, we have no evidence that the relative levels development of the securities
markets and  the size of the banking  sector, by  itself, affect  firms'  access to  external
financing. Thus, there is no evidence that the development of a market-based or bank-
based financial systemper  se affects access to financing.
Second, the securities  markets and the banking  system  affect firms'  ability to
obtain financing in different ways, especially at lower levels of financial development.
While the development of both improves access to external financing, the development of
securities markets is more related to long-term financing, whereas the development of the
banking sector is more related to the availability of short-term financing. Thus, for these
countries differences in contracting environments that affect the relative development of
3 Dropping  outliers  makes  TOR less  significant  but LAW  &ORDER  more  significant.
31the  stock market and  the banking system may have implications  for which  firms  and
which projects obtain financing.
Third, the effect  of the securities markets and  banking system development  is
closely  tied  to  the  level  of  development  of  the  country's  contracting  environment.
Differences in the activity level of the securities markets not predicted by the contracting
environment  are  not  significantly related  to  the  ability  of  firms  do  obtain  external
financing. This is consistent with the emphasis in LLSV on the importance of the legal
system on financing.
Fourth, the proportion of firms that grow at rates that cannot be self-financed is
positively  related to  the  development of  both the  securities markets  and  the banking
system. This is consistent with the findings of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998).
5. CONCLUSION
The relative development of banks versus markets varies considerably across
countries.  The financial systems of some countries, such as the US, are market-based,
whereas the financial systems of other economies, such as Japan, are bank-based.  In this
paper we investigate whether this difference in the organization of financial systems
affects firms' ability to obtain external financing for growth.
Our initial finding that that the proportion of firms that grow at rates that cannot
be self-financed is positively related to the development of both the securities markets
and  the  banking  system.  This  is  consistent with  the  findings  of  Demirguc-Kunt  and
Maksimovic  (1998),  and  with parallel  findings  of  Levine  and  Zervos  (1998),  at  the
country level, and Rajan and Zingales (1998), at the industry level.
14 The squared  terms do not develop  significant  coefficients  in STCOUNT  regressions. In LTCOUNT
32Our  results  show  that  the  effects of  the  stock  market  and  banking  system
development on firms' growth is closely tied to the level of development of the country's
contracting environment. Development of the financial system beyond that predicted by
the contracting environment are not significantly related to the ability of firms to obtain
external financing. This is consistent with the emphasis on the importance of the legal
system in LLSV on financing.
We find no  evidence that the relative levels of development of  the securities
markets compared to that of the banking sector, affect firms' access to external financing.
Thus,  there  is  no  evidence that  the  development of  a  market-based or  bank-based
financial system per se affects access to financing.
Finally, the securities markets and the banking system affect firms'  ability to
obtain financing in different ways, especially at lower levels of financial development.
While the development of both, if predicted by the contracting environment, improves
access to external financing, the development of securities markets is more related to
long-terrn financing, whereas the development of the banking sector is more related to the
availability of short-term financing. Thus, for these countries differences in contracting
environments that affect the relative development of the stock market and the banking
system may have implications for which firms and which projects obtain financing.
regressions  only  the  squared  TOR  is marginally  significant  in some  specifications  with  a negative  sign.
33Appendix
Table Al
Number of Firm Level Observations in Each Country
The data source for firm level variables is WorldScope.
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